


THE POWER OF INTERDEPENDENCE

LESSONS FROM AFRICA

David Oladipupo Kuranga

palgrave
macmillan



THE POWER OF INTERDEPENDENCE
Copyright © David Oladipupo Kuranga, 2012.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2012 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the World,
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above
companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978-1-137-01995-0

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kuranga, David Oladipupo, 1982–
The power of interdependence : lessons from Africa / by David
Oladipupo Kuranga.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-1-137-01992-9 (alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-137-01995-0
(alk. paper) 1. International relations. 2. Supranationalism.
3. International cooperation. 4. Africa—Foreign relations. I. Title.
JZ1318.K86 2012
327.1—dc23
2011053133

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Integra Software Services

First edition: July 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America.

CONTENTS

Preface	vii
Acknowledgments	ix
Acronyms	xi
1 Wielding the Power of Interdependency	1
2 A Gradual Emergence of Complex Interdependence in Africa	21
3 São Tomé and Príncipe	41
4 The Republic of Togo	71
5 The Islamic Republic of Mauritania	105
6 Lessons from Regional Organizations in Africa	147
Notes	161
Bibliography	165
Index	181

that the government would deal heavily with the group if it continued to disturb the peace in São Tomé.

The Portuguese ambassador, Mario Jesus dos Santos, noted that the young population in São Tomé may end up serving as recruits for the FDC soldiers if they were not given an economic stake and alternative opportunities. He also stated that soldiers dismissed after the 1995 coup still possessed weapons and remained good friends with the FDC soldiers. He indicated that he believed they also participated in the recent coup, and remained a threat. He thought the real "brains" behind the coup were political opponents of Menezes, who he said had personal—but not ideological—disputes with the president. He was likely referring to the clash that arose when Menezes alienated the family of (former) President Trovada upon taking office. The Portuguese ambassador indicated that his country had donated trucks to the military in the past, as well as other equipment yet to be installed. The charge d'affaires of Nigeria, S. F. Alege, continued to convey his country's support to aid the military in order to improve its conditions and reduce its threat to peace and stability (Alege 2003).

As Adada closed the meeting, he summed up the agreements reached therein: the IMG would not push for elections, it would continue to facilitate the Presidential Committee in the recovery of weapons that were in the wrong hands, it would maintain contact with stakeholders, it would address immigration issues, and it did not consider President Menezes' reappointment of Prime Minister das Neves a violation of the agreement, but an internal political matter. It was clear from the meeting that Adada and ECCAS were in the driver's seat. The meeting was called by Adada, and he chaired the meeting as the highest-ranking member present. In addition, he informed the committee of decisions that he and his government had made, such as the decision to hold a tripartite meeting between his president and his colleagues in Angola and Mozambique (MFA: ECAD doc.4 2009). He did not inform the Contact Group further of decisions his government was making with respect to the political disputes in São Tomé, including the national dialogue scheduled for November. His role in the meeting was to coordinate non-ECCAS members of the IMG, in line with the plan established by his country and the ECCAS regional block.

The Contact Group sent delegations to São Tomé and began to support the revitalization of the military in accordance with the agreement that ended the coup. South Africa and the United States sent delegations, as did Nigeria. Portugal had an existing military agreement with the archipelago that was clearly ineffective, failing to meet the needs of

São Tomé. Given this state of affairs, the representatives of the other three Contact Group countries continued to provide aid and explore partnerships with the armed forces of São Tomé. President Menezes welcomed the additional support and actively called upon Nigeria to assist with the military arrangements between São Tomé and the other Contact Group members (Pindar 31 July 2003, 2 August 2003). The military assistance and partnerships were all consistent with the mediated agreement, and did not go beyond military or financial assistance to delve into the internal political affairs of São Tomé and Príncipe.

In mid-September of 2003, the chairman of the IMG visited São Tomé to negotiate a dispute between President Menezes and some of his political rivals. Rumors were circulating that another coup was in the works. President Menezes threatened to arrest Patrice Trovada, the son of the former president, until his advisers persuaded him against it. According to Nigerian intelligence, Patrice Trovada was alleged to be one of the major financiers of the July 16 coup. He was also dismissed as foreign minister shortly after Menezes took office. After the intervention of Foreign Minister Adada, President Menezes announced the appointment of Patrice Trovada as his petroleum adviser (Pindar 29 September 2003, MFA: ECAD 2009). The appointment was an attempt by the incumbent to weaken the opposing coalition by co-opting one of its key financiers. The move was facilitated by ECCAS leader and IMG chairman Rodolphe Adada of the Congo. His continued vigilance over the internal politics of São Tomé and success in bringing together political rivals demonstrates again the relevance and impact of the regional organization in the process of stabilization. It further showed the impact of the sustained Monitoring Commission set up by ECCAS to monitor implementation and address disputes as they arose. None of the other IMG members or Contact Group donors had any desire to get involved in the internal politics of São Tomé, based on the statements they gave within closed door meetings. The IMG chairman and ECCAS considered themselves responsible for putting out fires and monitoring internal political disputes, and were welcomed as credible outside mediators by some of the key stakeholders in São Tomé. The pressure applied on Menezes—first to abstain from arresting Trovada, and then to go so far as appointing him a key member of the government—was another key example of binding, in which the regional organization puts pressure on "winners" to prevent them from seeking permanent advantages over political opponents.

Political disputes continued in São Tomé long after the coup of July 16, 2003. There were disputes between the parliament and the government

IMG = Inter national Monitoring Group